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Abstract 
 To date little to no empirical research has been conducted on the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement (SCM) and how it fits into the broader far-right domestic terrorist movement.  The 
main focus of this study is to determine if there is a significant difference between the SCM and 
the far-right in their demographic composition, trial strategies, and trial behaviors and whether 
the SCM should be grouped together with the broader far-right during analysis.  Using the 
American Terrorism Study (ATS), I coded 97 federal court cases involving sovereign citizen 
defendants (N=150) and ran basic frequencies on demographic and trial behavior variables on 
the SCM defendants and compared them to the non-sovereign citizen far-right defendants 
(N=382) in the ATS; the two groups were different at every level.  I then ran bivariate analysis to 
determine the significance in the differences between the two groups.  Results showed that all of 
the differences between the two groups were significant in relation to demographics, how 
sovereign citizens behave during trial, and how the government prosecutes sovereign citizen 
defendants.  In conclusion, the SCM is significantly, and substantially, different and should be 
studied separately from the broader far-right when conducting future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Beginning in 1993, sovereign citizen Winfield Thomas began selling fraudulent anti-tax 
trusts in Ohio by promoting them as estate planning vehicles to people who attended his 
seminars.  Thomas maintained that the trusts provided asset protection to his clients.  During the 
seminars Thomas often advised his clients to set up bank accounts using their trusts.  He argued 
that any payments made out of the trust bank accounts would be tax deductible.  In reality, the 
trust scheme was nothing more than an illegal strategy to hide monetary assets from the IRS.  
Thomas sold his trusts to approximately four hundred clients for $2,000 a piece, receiving nearly 
$142,000 in annual revenue.  Chad Rickle purchased a trust from Thomas after attending a 
seminar.  After building rapport with Thomas and others involved in the conspiracy, and using 
his college degree and experience in accounting, Rickle began to prepare tax returns in 1994 for 
individuals who purchased a trust.  Thomas taught Rickle how to prepare fraudulent trusts and 
individual income tax returns in a way consistent with the scheme Thomas was promoting.  By 
1997 the IRS began sending letters to the trust scheme clients requiring them to make good on 
their unpaid taxes.  Thomas and Rickle told their clients that if they kept their heads down and 
ignored the IRS, the problem would go away.  It did not.  
Between 1999 and 2000 Thomas had added Redemption Scheme (discussed later) as a 
new strategy for the clients to obstruct the IRS.  Clients of the trust scam prepared and sent to the 
IRS $28 million in bogus "Bills of Exchange," drafts, and other fictitious financial instruments in 
an effort to pay off their tax obligations.  The conspirators prepared over 900 fraudulent tax 
returns from 1994 to 2000 for an estimated tax loss of over $1,000,000, while they earned an 
average of $22,000 a year from preparing the returns.  In addition, between 1993 to 2006 
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Thomas and his co-conspirators helped their clients avoid paying over $15 million in taxes to the 
IRS. 
 Winfield Thomas and his co-conspirators were affiliated with a movement of far-right 
domestic extremists called the Sovereign Citizen Movement.  According to the FBI (2011), 
sovereign citizens are “anti-government extremists who believe that even though they physically 
reside in this country, they are separate or ‘sovereign’ from the United States” (p. 1).  Sovereigns 
believe that they are not subject to the authority of federal or state governments, and their actions 
often result in devastating consequences.  Sovereign citizens act on these beliefs by using tactics 
that authorities have described as “paper terrorism.”  Paper terrorism, which will be discussed in 
more detail later, is the use of financial instruments (such as frivolous tax returns or bogus liens) 
to target the government and its employees.  The case study above is a prime example of paper 
terrorism and the large-scale monetary consequences faced by the government due to the radical 
beliefs of sovereign citizens.   
To date, little is known about the demographics of sovereign citizens or the nature of the 
threat that sovereign citizens pose even though police consider them to be a significant threat in 
their communities.  Moreover, I could find almost no empirical research on the Sovereign 
Citizen Movement as a separate entity of far-right extremism.  When the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement has been addressed in extant literature, the focus has been on violence rather than 
paper terrorism.  This research examines how the Sovereign Citizen Movement differs from that 
of far-right domestic terrorists as a whole and will make a case for studying sovereign citizens 
separately from the far-right.  For this purpose, I will examine the following research question: 
How similar are adherents of the Sovereign Citizen Movement to defendants in the broader 
far-right movement?  This paper will also examine the sovereign citizen’s behaviors throughout 
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the trial process in an effort to understand how the followers of the movement act towards the 
authority of the federal court system.  For that purpose, I will examine the following research 
question: What methods have the federal courts used to prosecute SCM adherents, and how 
have those individuals behaved in court? 
The following chapter will provide a detailed background of the movement to establish a 
timeline of how it has grown into the most prominent anti-government movement currently in 
the United States.  The chapter will conclude with more detailed explanation of my research 
questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND 
 
This project focuses on the Sovereign Citizen Movement (SCM) as a subtype of far-right 
domestic terrorism steeped in anti-government ideology.  Emphasis is placed on ascertaining 
demographic information on the adherents of SCM ideology.  An additional goal of this paper is 
to determine empirically whether the SCM differs significantly from far-right extremism in terms 
of demographics and trial behaviors, but I will also examine whether the government uses 
different strategies to prosecute SCM adherents.  The first section of this chapter contains a 
synopsis of the history of the SCM and a timeline centered on how the SCM grew into a 
dangerous far-right terrorist movement.  
 
Economic and Social Factors 
The 1960s and the Vietnam War brought with it the rise of the extremist far-left, which in the 
United States was mostly made up of college students and college graduates who fought against 
what they believed to be the United States government’s overreach in foreign nations (Smith, 
2000).  The far-left was built upon an ideology of socialist beliefs and a hatred of capitalism 
resulting in a movement that was arguably more bloody and violent than what would be felt by 
the far-right in the years to come.  The persistent violence within the far-left movement resulted 
in many leftist sympathizers distancing themselves from the violent groups.  So by the time the 
Vietnam War ended the zeal of the far-left had already begun to dwindle, paving the way for the 
emergence of a new ideology of far-right groups in the 1970s (Smith & Morgan, 1994).  The 
1980s brought with it an influx of homegrown, domestic terrorist organizations that continued to 
grow in numbers throughout the subsequent decades.  Numerous extremist groups started to gain 
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traction in collective opposition to issues of affirmative action, welfare, race mixing, 
homosexuality, and abortion (Smith, 1994; Smith, 2000).  Far-right groups formed along a 
myriad of motivational factors—such as white supremacy, anti-gun legislation, anti-abortion, 
anti-Semitism, and a fringe religious movement, called Christian Identity (discussed in more 
detail below).  Furthermore, the social conflicts of the 1980s mixed with another powerful 
motivator—a struggling economy.   
The 1980s witnessed growth in the far-right for many reasons, and chief among them was 
the economy.  Indeed, a national economic crisis was being felt across the country.  The farm 
crisis of the 1980s, and the bank crisis that followed, had a severe and profoundly negative 
impact on the United States’ economy.  According to Kent (2015), “issues that gave rise to the 
Freemen and sovereign citizens’ forerunner in the 1970s, the Posse Comitatus, involved 
enormous jumps in interest rates as banks reacted to global political and trade realities; but these 
increases crippled farmers, many of whom had taken out low-interest loans” (p. 7-8).  The farm 
crisis resulted in an estimated 235,000 farms failing, which also destroyed 60,000 supportive 
businesses in the process.  Additionally, many banks failed because they were dependent on the 
mortgage and debt payments from the farmers that were affected by the crisis (Kent, 2015).  
Overlapping with the farm crisis, the Savings and Loan crisis, which started during the late 
1980s, resulted in 1,000 banks closing their doors and the loss of over $500 billion in assets.  
Due to the poor economic conditions of the country and the federal government using tax dollars 
to bail out the banks, the number of people in the United States who believed that federal income 
taxes were too high reached record levels during this time period.  According to Levitas (2001), 
an anti-tax movement quickly began to grow throughout the country.  During the 1980s, the 
federal government created new laws in an attempt to slow the growth of the anti-tax movement 
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by prosecuting anti-tax protestors more harshly (Levitas, 2001).  The new laws were not as 
effective as the government had hoped, and the anti-tax movement was slowed down rather than 
immobilized completely.  The economic crises helped to influence the growth of anti-
government movements across the country, especially that of the Posse Comitatus and the early 
SCM.  However, before the economic crises, the leaders of the Posse Comitatus and their 
extremist anti-government ideologies heavily influenced the SCM since its formation.  
 
The Role of Extremist Ideologies and Leaders 
According to Smith (1994) the extreme right became linked to the Christian Identity Movement.  
The Christian Identity Movement was ideologically centered on the belief that members of the 
Aryan race were God’s chosen people, not the Jews, and that America was God’s promised land 
reserved for Aryans alone.  The ideology was built around radical interpretations of the Bible and 
it was embedded with conspiracy theories that the United States government had been infiltrated 
completely by Jews creating what the movement called the Zionist Occupational Government.  It 
is under this belief system that the numerous far–right groups emerged. 
Within the far-right movement, a Christian Identity patriot group emerged in 1969 under 
the leadership of Henry Beach and William Potter Gale in Portland, Oregon, called the Posse 
Comitatus.  This group would have an important influence on what would later become the 
Sovereign Citizen Movement.  The Posse Comitatus, whose name translates to power of the 
county, combined an anti-taxation and anti-government ideology with the anti-Semitism of the 
Christian Identity Movement that allowed the group to quickly gain traction with numerous 
supporters and expand to thirteen additional states within a few years of its inception (Smith, 
1994).  Posse Comitatus adherents espoused the idea that the county sheriff, specifically one that 
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they had personally voted into office, was the highest form of authority and the only authority 
that the group recognized (Kent, 2015; Fleishman, 2004).  Members of the Posse Comitatus 
embraced the belief that the federal government had no power over them.  A common expression 
of this belief was their refusal to pay taxes.  As the years progressed the Posse Comitatus became 
increasingly violent and encouraged people in the rural parts of the country to defend their 
homes from the government while the group’s leaders threatened to execute government officials 
who violated their oaths of office (Smith, 1994).  The surge in violent rhetoric and acts closely 
coincided with the agriculture crisis sweeping the nation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which 
allowed Gale and the Posse to spread their ideology to struggling farmers across the farm belt 
(Levitas, 1998).  It was during this time of economic crisis that the SCM began to take form as 
an offshoot of the Posse Comitatus.  It is important to discuss the Posse Comitatus in this 
research because it developed much of the anti-government discourse that eventually provided 
the SCM with the rhetoric it now uses today.  However, despite getting a boost from the Posse 
Comitatus during the 1970s, the ideology of the SCM did not fully form until the 1980s (Anti-
Defamation League [ADL], 2012). 
William Gale, a farmer himself, was extremely upset with the federal government during 
the crisis.  He used his newly founded Posse Comitatus to fight against the banking system and 
the government.  Gale’s actions served only to heighten the federal government’s awareness of 
both the growing anti-tax agenda and the SCM, which quickly gained notoriety as an offshoot of 
the Posse Comitatus (Kent, 2015).  However, the rise of the SCM was short lived.  As the farm 
crisis abated in the late 1980s, the SCM also faded (Steinback, 2011).  The SCM then reemerged 
for a brief period of time in the 1990s as a result of high profile government conflicts that 
occurred across the country. 
 8 
High Profile Conflicts 
During the 1990s, three major events had a profound impact on the Sovereign Citizen Movement 
and far-right terrorism as a whole.  Two of these events acted as catalysts to the far-right—Ruby 
Ridge in 1992 and Waco in 1993.  The final event, the Oklahoma City bombing, extinguished 
the spark that had been ignited in the far-right during the two years leading up to it.  Ruby Ridge 
and Waco created a total body count just shy of 90 people, and the far-right took violent 
exception to these deaths.  More profoundly, the far-right identified with the victims.  Preaching 
to anyone who would listen, the right argued that the deaths of these individuals were the direct 
result of an overreach of federal government power.  The violence fueled the far-right’s anti-
government hatred and resulted in an increase of extremist activity.  From 1993 through 1994, 
the far-right saw a surge of growth in its numbers that it had not seen since the 1980s.  Timothy 
McVeigh then bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, temporarily 
chilling the growth of the extreme right.  The bombing forced many far-right groups and their 
members underground as law enforcement focused its investigative efforts solely on members of 
far-right extremist organizations.  A few years after the OKC bombing, militia and patriot groups 
began to resurface, this time in response to the globalist conspiracy of the New World Order 
(Pitcavage, 2001).  Militia and patriot groups are related to the SCM in terms of anti-government 
beliefs, but Pitcavage argues that there are important differences, especially among their 
ideologies and tactics.  Patriot and militia groups rely on paramilitary tactics and heavy 
weaponry, while the SCM focuses its attention on acts of paper terrorism.  Though the patriot 
movement is different from the SCM in some fundamental ways, Steinback (2011) argues that 
the reemergence of the Patriot movement rekindled the SCM during the 1990s, the financial 
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crisis of the late 2000s provided fuel for the SCM to grow, and the election of Barack Obama set 
the movement aflame.   
 
Emergence of the Modern SCM 
The bank crisis and real estate crisis of 2008 had a severe, negative impact on the U.S. economy 
resulting in nearly 4 million home foreclosures that displaced 10 million people (Kent, 2015).  
Beyond the recession, the proliferation of the Internet and the election of the United States’ first 
black president fueled the SCM’s growth.  These factors combined to create a situation that made 
many far-right extremists anxious and have allowed the SCM to experience continued growth 
since 2008 (Steinback, 2011).  Indeed, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) argues that the SCM 
has had the largest growth in membership and activity of any anti-government movement within 
the United States (2012).  Troublingly, there is no indication that the movement is slowing down, 
and the literature suggests that each year brings an increase in violent confrontations, fraud, and 
intimidation tactics through acts of paper terrorism (ADL, 2012).  Recently, the Department of 
Homeland Security released a statement claiming that the threat of the SCM is equal to, and at 
times greater than, that of foreign terrorist groups such as ISIS and it is an important issue to 
address (Perez & Bruer, 2015).  Although the SCM has seen continuous growth, little is known 
about the nature of the SCM and how the SCM differs from other far-right terrorism.  
 
Research Problem 
The Sovereign Citizen Movement is a growing and potentially dangerous form of terrorism, yet 
little is known about the nature of the movement.  The extant literature and research is generally 
anecdotal, and it lacks sufficient, if any, empirical analysis (see, for example, ADL, 2012; 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2011).  This lack of research is a significant problem 
since state and federal law enforcement officials consider the SCM to be a major threat to the 
well-being of the country.  According to a recent study conducted by the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), contemporary law 
enforcement agencies are quite concerned with the threat presented by adherents of the SCM, 
and consider sovereign citizens a larger threat than groups associated with Christian Identity and 
white supremacy; this represents a vast difference in law enforcement attitudes from a few 
decades ago (Carter et al., 2014).  Current empirical treatment of the SCM poses an interesting 
dilemma for researchers, and demands a fresh approach.  The SCM is typically discussed within 
the broader far-right movement, but should it be?   
Carter et al., (2014) suggest that sovereign citizens are quite different when compared to 
other right wing individuals due to the fact that SCM ideology is not supremacist in nature.  
Rather, the authors maintain, SCM ideology focuses strictly on the government’s illegitimate 
authority and not on the social status of individuals associated with minority groups.  Grouping 
sovereign citizens together with other far-rightists could explain why the existing literature on 
the SCM is limited in scope and relatively devoid of empirical findings.  This is troubling, as the 
available literature provides little in the way of reliable findings to aid either academic or law 
enforcement communities.  Perhaps researchers should consider the SCM as a unique subgroup 
of the far-right, and give them separate treatment altogether.  My first research question will 
address this issue:  How similar are adherents of the SCM to defendants in the broader far-right 
movement?  Palpable differences would indicate that separate treatment is necessary for future 
research. 
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 Yet another issue that arises in extant research is the focus on violent acts.  That approach 
is flawed in the case of the SCM.  If paper terrorism is the primary threat the SCM poses, the 
violence-only focus in studying sovereign citizens is not likely to provide a very detailed or 
useful understanding of the subject matter, and more troubling, such research may provide 
misleading results.  If it is important to develop an understanding of what SCM cases involve, 
then a different focus is warranted.  One area where the differences between the far-right and the 
SCM may be measured is in courtroom behavior.  Much is already known about far-right 
courtroom behavior, such as plea bargain rates (Shields et al., 2006; Shields, 2008), about the 
strategies the federal prosecutors use to process far-right cases (Shields et al., 2009), and about 
case outcomes (Shields, 2012), so results from a study of the SCM should provide some 
meaningful insight.  As will be discussed in the following literature section, some commentators 
have expressed concern that SCM adherents use tactics to plug-up and delay the federal court 
system.  At present, we do not know the extent of this problem, whether it is different from the 
broader far-right, or even what it looks like.  These issues will be addressed in my secondary 
research question: What methods have the federal courts used to prosecute SCM adherents, and 
how have those individuals behaved in court?  
  
 12 
CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While little of the literature on the Sovereign Citizen Movement is based on the empirical 
analysis of data, the extant literature is important, and in many cases, quite rich and detailed.  I 
have organized this chapter by first reviewing literature on the ideology of the SCM.  What 
follows is a discussion of the known literature on the structure and organization of the SCM and 
what scholars have noted about the changing demographics of the movement.  Finally, I will 
provide a review of relevant literature on the targets of sovereign citizen adherents as well as the 
behaviors practiced by sovereign citizens in the courtroom.   
 
Ideology 
Similar to other groups within the far-right, the ideology of the SCM was originally rooted in the 
Christian Identity beliefs of anti-Semitism, but it was also marked by a strong anti-government 
and anti-taxation stance.  Like the Posse Comitatus, the SCM adamantly opposes the authority of 
the federal government, which includes paying any form of federal taxes.  The literature suggests 
that over the years, however, the SCM left behind its Christian Identity roots and embraced an 
anti-tax and anti-government ideology devoid of racism (ADL, 2012). 
Sovereign citizens—who also call themselves constitutionalists, state citizens, and 
freemen to indicate to others that they are not under the jurisdiction of the federal government—
believe that there are two forms of government: an illegitimate government and the original 
government (FBI, 2011; Kent, 2015; ADL, 2012).  To them the illegitimate government is the 
current structure of the federal government in the United States.  The SCM believes that at some 
point since its founding, the federal government drifted away from the original and intended 
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common law foundation.  Common law, unlike the system of law in place today, revolved 
around principles of legal precedent rather than legal statutes, which sovereign citizens believe 
dates back to the American Revolution after the colonists were freed from British rule and were 
granted authority over their individual property (Parker, 2014).  According to adherents of the 
SCM, the original government did not interfere with its citizens; it governed the people under the 
authority of God’s laws.  To sovereign citizens, when the government does not govern using 
God’s laws it is going against the best interest of the people (ADL, 2012; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit [DTOU], 2010).  Interestingly, however, 
there are many competing viewpoints within the SCM on when this transition in government 
actually occurred and no exact date is available (ADL, 2012).   
Even though adherents of the SCM reject the authority of the federal government, they 
still use both federal and state laws to construct parts of their ideology, which can be seen 
through their interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Fleishman, 
2004).  According to Finch and Flowers (2012), even though the Fourteenth Amendment was 
passed in an effort to unify the country after the Civil War, sovereigns believe that the 
Amendment was a scam orchestrated by the federal government.  SCM adherents believe the 
Amendment forced the people of the United States to give up their state citizenship, making 
them federal, corporate citizens without their knowledge.  Simultaneously, the Amendment 
allegedly created a special class of citizenship where citizens would only be allowed certain 
rights that were granted to them by the government (ADL, 2012).  Sovereign citizens believe that 
“the federal government tricked Americans into becoming ‘citizens of the United States’ by 
offering them privileges…which were actually hidden contracts with the government through 
which Americans unknowingly gave away their sovereignty” (ADL, 2012, p. 3).  Because they 
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believe they have found the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the only way for 
sovereign citizens to become subjects of the illegitimate government is by voluntarily giving up 
their common law rights and seeking contracts with the federal government (Parker, 2014).  
Examples of these contracts include birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and social security cards.  
It should come as no surprise that sovereigns do not carry these items because they believe them 
to be null and void (Finch & Flowers, 2012; Fleishman, 2004).  Sovereign citizens believe that 
obtaining a driver’s license is pointless because the act of driving is regarded as a God-given 
right, and law enforcement officers do not have the power to tell them otherwise (Finch & 
Flowers, 2012).  Additionally, devoted followers of the SCM refuse to use zip codes in their 
addresses because they believe using one is tantamount to submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
federal government.  By simply tearing up these contracts from the government, sovereigns 
believe that they retain their common law rights and become “immune to the illegitimate 
government” (Anti-Defamation League [ADL], 2005; ADL, 2012, p. 3).  In reality, it is simply 
not feasible for sovereign citizens to give up every contract with the government, so they 
conform under protest when they have to rely on the government for essential needs (Jackson, 
2013).  An example of this would be sovereign citizens sending their children to a public school 
to receive an education.   
SCM adherents use a number of justifications to bolster their beliefs about the federal 
government, but one of the most important is the Redemption Theory.  This theory is the driving 
force behind the movement’s desire to defraud banks, credit institutions, and above all, the 
federal government and its entities (FBI, 2011).  Redemption Theory promotes a belief that the 
United States government went bankrupt in 1933 when it abandoned the gold standard as the 
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basis for its currency (DTOU, 2010).  According to SCM, this left paper money valueless and 
allowed the federal government to use its own citizens as collateral to trade with other countries.   
Sovereign citizens believe the United States government issues social security numbers 
and birth certificates as a means to register U.S. citizens “to be used in trade agreements with 
other countries” (FBI, 2011; DTOU, 2010, p. 6).  Sovereigns draw this conclusion based on the 
practice of the government issuing birth certificates containing names in all capital letters—
sovereigns believe a name spelled in this manner signifies the corporate shell of the person, 
rather than the flesh-and-blood person—and print them on bond paper with a government seal 
(Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC], 2010).  Once citizens are registered at birth, they believe 
each person has a different net worth ranging anywhere from $630,000 to $3 million, although 
this amount has been debated.  The amount of each person’s individual worth corresponds to his 
or her social security number.  This money is allegedly kept in accounts under the corporate shell 
names of each citizen—in “straw man” accounts—within the U.S. Department of Treasury (FBI, 
2011; DTOU, 2010).  Sovereign citizens believe that in order to gain access to the money in their 
straw man accounts, they must extort the money from the U.S. Treasury by filing “legitimate IRS 
and Uniform Commercial Code forms for illegitimate purposes” (FBI, 2011, p.2).  Sovereigns 
believe that doing so correctly will give them access to these accounts so that they can use the 
money to eliminate their mortgages, credit card debts, and car debts (FBI, 2011; Finch & 
Flowers, 2012).  Essentially, this process is an attempt by sovereign citizens to charge their debt 
to the U.S. Treasury Department with the belief that their debts will be paid off by the money in 
their individual straw man accounts (DTOU, 2010).  In an effort to access their straw man 
accounts, many sovereign citizens have resorted to criminal behavior such as mail fraud, money 
laundering, or tax violations, while others travel the country teaching fellow adherents how to 
 16 
commit fraud and access their accounts for a fee (FBI, 2011).  These individuals that travel and 
teach are referred to as gurus and will be discussed in more detail later in this section.  
The beliefs of the SCM are unusual in that they take legitimate historical events as the 
root of their conspiracy theories, but manipulate and obscure those events to use as evidence for 
their claims against the government (Finch & Flowers, 2012).  According to scholars, sovereign 
citizens differ from person to person in their commitment to the ideology because they adhere to 
the parts of the ideology that they like and dismiss the aspects that they do not (Fleishman, 2004; 
Kent, 2015).  Kent (2015) stated that followers of the movement range anywhere from 
individuals who make “critical comments among friends, to public statements of displeasure,” to 
those who engage in everything from “social protest…to criminal attacks against government 
property and politicians” (p. 1).  While there are a handful of people who reject the entire 
governmental system and follow no rules at all, most sovereign citizens do not reach such a 
drastic and dangerous level of adherence and are situated somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum (Jackson, 2013).  The following sections will look at the structural make-up of the 
movement as well as what we currently know about their courtroom behaviors.  
 
Structure and Demographics 
Although sovereign citizens espouse an anti-government ideology, they are not considered 
anarchists like individuals associated with far-left terrorism in the 19th and 20th centuries (FBI, 
2011; Jensen, 2009).  Instead, adherents to the sovereign citizen ideology carry out the ideals of 
the movement on an individual basis without the governance of a central office or leadership.  
Because sovereign citizens do not act within organized groups, most people are not aware that 
the SCM exists (ADL, 2012; IACP Committee on Terrorism [IACP], 2014).  However, on 
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special occasions members of the SCM do come together informally for a small duration to help 
each other with filling out fraudulent documents, creating tax evasion schemes, or simply to talk 
to one another about their ideological motivations (FBI, 2011; ADL, 2012; DTOU, 2010).  
Because there is no central leadership, it is nearly impossible to know the exact number of 
individuals who claim to be sovereign citizens within the United States.  According to the 
Southern Poverty Law Center (“Sovereign Citizens Movement,” n.d.), in 2011 the SCM had 
around 200,000 non-violent followers and another 100,000 who were considered to be hardcore 
(potentially violent) sovereigns, for an estimated total of 300,000 nationwide.   
Although the exact numbers of the movement are hard to calculate, the Anti-Defamation 
League (2012) asserts that determining the personality types and demographics of sovereign 
citizens is much easier.  People who claim to follow sovereign citizen ideology are typically 
middle-aged or older, and the majority of the followers are males.  The ADL notes, however, that 
a sizeable female population exists, with some of them being gurus (experts on paper terrorism) 
within the movement.  Historically, members of the SCM have predominantly been white due to 
its origins in the Christian Identity Movement, but more recently that has changed.  Because the 
anti-government ideology is applicable to any race and ethnicity, the number of non-white 
sovereign citizens has allegedly grown since the 1990s (ADL, 2012).  For instance, there has 
been an increase in the number of African Americans in the SCM, with an even larger number 
active in the Moorish Movement.  African American adherents believe that they hold a 
privileged status similar to that of Native Americans.  African American sovereign citizens tend 
to overlook, or are possibly unaware of, the racist beginnings of the SCM (Nelson, 2011; Parker, 
2014).   
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Gurus within the SCM are typically in their 60s and 70s and this has caused law 
enforcement to underestimate their propensity towards violence since traditionally violent crimes 
are not committed by people in that age group (Hirshi & Gottfredson, 1983).  Despite the age of 
gurus, some researchers suggest that new growth within the movement has attracted younger 
recruits (ADL, 2012).  This means that the age range within the movement has the possibility of 
being vast.  
According to the ADL (2012), the SCM attracts people who are financially stressed, 
people who are angry about government regulation, and con artists who want to make money.  
The ADL suggests that these people seek out the SCM as a way to escape and find relief for 
life’s hardships.  But others disagree.  While the ADL argues that followers of the SCM can be 
evaluated based on specific demographics and characteristics, the IACP (2014) believes that 
“sovereign citizens are not typically identifiable by age, gender, distinctive clothing, tattoos, 
body piercings, or hair styles” (p. 58-60).  In the current study, the demographics of the indictees 
will be analyzed in upcoming sections in order to determine if the ADL was correct in their 
claims made about the structure and demographics of the SCM.   
 
Targets 
While it is beyond the scope of this project to examine the targets of the Sovereign Citizen 
Movement, a brief overview of this subject will help inform my hypotheses.  The literature 
suggests that sovereign citizens predominantly engage in non-violent acts.  Moreover, when they 
do become violent it is typically spontaneous, where their actions are directed towards law 
enforcement officers during home visits or traffic stops; acts of violence can also include threats, 
citizen’s arrests, and takeovers of government buildings (ADL, 2012).  When stopped by the 
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police, sovereign citizens are already on edge.  They do not view the officer as a person, but 
rather as a symbol of the government that is oppressing their liberties.  Pitcavage (1998) argues 
that this is the main reason confrontations become dangerous.  According to Finch and Flowers 
(2012), encounters between law enforcement and sovereign citizens are the most dangerous 
during traffic stops because sovereign citizens view traffic stops as unconstitutional.  Another 
unique SCM view that complicates traffic stops is sovereign citizen’s definition of crime.  
Sovereigns maintain that only those actions that harm victims are criminal, and common traffic 
violations, such as speeding, lack a victim and are not considered to be crimes (Pitcavage, 1998).  
Finch and Flowers (2012) reported that while acts of violence are rare among the SCM, there 
have been a few cases of fatal shootings during traffic stops since 2000.  An example of this 
would be when father and son sovereign citizens, Jerry and Joe Kane, shot and killed two West 
Memphis, Arkansas, police officers during a traffic stop in May 2010.  During traffic stops, 
sovereign citizens have been known to argue with the law enforcement officers about the 
officers’ jurisdiction and their right to stop a citizen when traffic violations produce no victim, 
however, verbal arguments can turn to violent, physical encounters very quickly.  
The literature suggests that the most common tactic of the Sovereign Citizen Movement 
is paper terrorism—false liens, financial scams, identity theft, and the like—and these tactics are 
frequently directed at the most popular target of the SCM: the federal government and its 
employees.  Among paper terrorism tactics, tax evasion and tax scams are two of the most 
common forms due to sovereign citizen’s anti-tax ideology (ADL, 2012).  Tax schemes are 
directed at the Internal Revenue Service as well as state taxing authorities as a way to publically 
demonstrate sovereign citizens’ discontent with the tax system as a whole.  Additionally, 
sovereigns use paper terrorism tactics to harass, threaten, intimidate, or retaliate against their 
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perceived enemies, such as law enforcement officers, attorneys, judges, and other government 
employees (Finch & Flowers, 2012; Steinback, 2011; ADL, 2012; Chamberlain & Haider-
Markel, 2005; Kent, 2015).  Furthermore, Fleishman (2004) argues that whenever sovereigns 
target someone in particular it is usually a person they believe is directly responsible for the 
hardships that the sovereign is facing from the government.  Examples of this would be 
sovereign citizens filing frivolous lawsuits or liens against the arresting officer or prosecuting 
attorney handling their court case.  
The literature is not clear when exactly sovereign citizens target certain people.  
However, speaking anecdotally, and based on information from the court cases I have coded for 
this study, sovereign citizens prefer targeting law enforcement officers and government officials 
following an encounter (Smith & Damphousse, 2000); I have found no examples so far to 
suggest that sovereign citizens have targeted individuals without a prior confrontation.   
As previously stated, law enforcement officers are targeted because SCM adherents see 
them as the face of the illegitimate government, and that has the potential of leading to tense 
situations when officers cite sovereigns with a ticket during traffic violations, remove them from 
squatting in foreclosed homes, or arrest them at their residences (ADL, 2012).  Additionally, 
attorneys are targeted by the SCM due to the movement’s ideology and conspiracy theories 
rooted in radical interpretations of the Constitution.  They believe that the “original” Constitution 
contained a Thirteenth Amendment1 that would not have granted citizenship to those who hold 
titles of nobility.  According to Pitcavage (1997), sovereign citizens consider lawyers to be 
nobility because attorneys use “Esq.” after their names.  Sovereigns also believe that attorneys 
                                                 
1 The radical interpretation of the 13th Amendment lead to the SCM creating common law courts 
in an effort to retaliate against officials of the current justice system.  For a detailed overview of 
the common law court system, refer to Chamberlain & Haider-Markel (2005) and Pitcavage 
(1997). 
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removed the original Thirteenth Amendment years ago.  For both of these reasons, sovereign 
citizens are wary of attorneys and the legal system as a whole (Fleishman, 2004).  As they do 
with police officers, sovereign citizens allegedly target attorneys and other justice system 
officials during and after trial.  
 Sovereigns place liens on their target’s homes as retribution for being arrested by the 
police, charged with a crime by the federal prosecutor, or sentenced to time in prison by the 
judge.  This tactic has caused victims serious financial damage, especially in cases where the 
individuals remained unaware a lien was placed on their property or failed to remove it in a 
timely fashion (Finch & Flowers, 2012).  Finch and Flowers also determined that sovereigns file 
lawsuits against law enforcement and government officials to seek reimbursement for the amount 
of time the sovereign was detained.  Time is very important to sovereign citizens.  They maintain 
that if government officials waste a sovereign’s time, he or she should reimburse the sovereign 
monetarily.  
Sovereigns also target government officials with lawsuits by asserting copyright 
infringement—for the official’s non-permissive use of the sovereign’s name—as grounds for 
legal action.  According to the DTOU (2010) “sovereign citizens believe their name is their 
personal property and cannot be used by others without prior approval…and that the 
unauthorized use of a sovereign citizen’s name entitles them to financial remedy from the 
offender.  This, in their view, allows them to file a lien against the offender to collect that debt” 
(p. 10).  These lawsuits and liens, such as with previous examples, can claim millions of dollars 
in damages.  Sovereign citizens have also been known to target law enforcement officers by 
filing false IRS documents that show that the sovereign citizen has paid them a large sum of 
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money, which raises red flags with the IRS when the income is not reported on income tax forms 
and leaves the officer completely unaware of these actions (IACP, 2014).   
 Due to the nature of their work, law enforcement and government officials are the most 
likely to find themselves in the crosshairs of the SCM.  According to Fleishman “even a simple 
traffic stop can ripen into years of legal battles with parties who do not recognize the authority of 
local government” (2004, p. 9).  The bottom line is that no matter how minor or serious the 
perceived offenses against them, sovereigns use fictitious liens and lawsuits as a way to 
intimidate police officers and members of the justice system (Finch & Flowers, 2012).  Indeed, 
the majority of law enforcement officers and government officials do not have the training 
needed to effectively protect themselves against civil actions brought on by sovereign citizens 
(IACP, 2014).   
  
Courtroom Behaviors 
Pitcavage (1997) suggests that sovereign citizens target the court system whenever they are on 
trial.  Sovereigns, unlike typical criminals, often express joy at the prospect of appearing in 
court.  Like previously stated, they hold the belief that there is a hidden history of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and sovereigns do not consider lawyers to be citizens (Pitcavage, 1997).  Because of 
this, they frequently reject court appointed counsel and defend themselves pro se in an effort to 
avoid the attorneys they distrust so much (IACP, 2014).  Additionally, Parker (2014) asserts that 
sovereign citizens hold a belief that under common law there is no government law or ruling that 
can deprive any citizen of their common law rights.  SCM adherents warn that these common 
laws are under assault.  They believe that the illegitimate federal government has attempted to 
eclipse the common law via ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments (Parker, 
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2014).  Sovereigns maintain that the court system is corrupt and no longer follows common law, 
but instead, is built on a foundation of commercial and admiralty law.  Sovereigns now consider 
the courts to be military in nature, and argue they illegitimately administer the laws of the sea 
and international commerce (SPLC, 2010).  Using these beliefs as the foundation for the 
argument that the federal government has no jurisdiction over them, sovereigns challenge the 
government’s jurisdiction at trial in an attempt to have their cases dismissed.  
 Sovereign citizens also bog down the court with fraudulent and frivolous paperwork, in 
what Finch and Flowers (2012) call “a conscious effort” to confuse government officials and 
disrupt the criminal justice system in hopes that the court will dismiss the case rather than 
continuing to deal with them.  The authors warn that filing irrelevant and pseudo-legal 
paperwork slows down the trial process and risks costing the court system a lot of money over 
time.  Currently, the literature regarding trial strategies of sovereign citizens is sparse.  The 
present study will attempt to fill in this gap.  
The previous literature offers a comprehensive overview regarding what we currently 
know about the composition of people who identify with the SCM, and a discussion of how 
scholars think they operate during trials.  Under the umbrella of my research questions, I have 
framed the following hypotheses to examine the arguments presented in the literature.  To test 
my first research question I created hypotheses one through three.  These hypotheses will be 
tested using the demographic variables gender, race, and age at arrest to compare the 
differences between the SCM and other far-right adherents.  
  
 H1 Sovereign citizens have a higher female population than other far-right adherents 
H2 Sovereign citizens have a higher minority population than other far-right adherents 
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H3 Sovereign citizens are older than other far-right adherents 
 
To test my second research question I have turned to the literature and developed seven 
additional hypotheses.  I will analyze these hypotheses using the following variables: trial 
outcome, conviction rate, defense method, attorney type, and average number of motions filed.   
 
H4 Sovereign citizens take their cases to trial more often than other far-right 
defendants 
H5 Sovereign citizens enter fewer plea bargains than other far-right defendants 
H6 Sovereign citizens have higher conviction rates than other far-right defendants 
H7 Sovereign citizens use a “lack of jurisdiction” defense at a higher rate than other far-
right defendants 
 
H8 Sovereign citizens appear pro se more often than other far-right defendants 
H9 Sovereign citizen court cases are longer on average than those of the other far-right 
H10 Sovereign citizens file more motions than other far-right defendants 
 
Each of the aforementioned variables will be discussed more thoroughly below.  The following 
chapter provides a description of the data and methodology I have employed in the current study 
to examine these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the data I am using, the inclusion criteria I used to locate and code 
Sovereign Citizen Movement cases, the variables I used in the analyses, and the types of 
analyses I performed.  
 
American Terrorism Study 
For this project, I will use the American Terrorism Study (ATS), which contains data on 
federally indicted terrorists, with cases spanning the last 35 years.  The ATS is an open-source, 
relational database that is comprised of federal court cases, the majority of which are the result of 
an FBI terrorism investigation.  The ATS uses the FBI’s definition of domestic terrorism when 
collecting cases.  According to the FBI, domestic terrorism is: “the unlawful use, or threatened 
use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United 
States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance 
of political or social objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005, p. V).  That definition 
posed a problem for this project.  To this point, the ATS did not include SCM cases as a separate 
category of the far-right, and the few SCM cases that were included in the database were there 
because they met the FBI definition of terrorism, i.e. they were violent in nature (for example, 
Posse Comitatus cases).  As mentioned above, the literature suggests that most SCM cases are 
not violent, but rather focus on paper terrorism.  Therefore, I developed inclusion criteria to 
locate federal SCM cases.  
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I first identified potential cases using online media articles and nonprofit legal advocacy 
groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation League.  These 
groups have released numerous articles listing sovereign citizen activity by year and state as well 
as individually listing dozens of sovereign citizens by name along with their criminal activity.  
Once I identified potential cases through the media, I searched for the individuals via Public 
Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER).  When I determined that the person of interest had 
co-conspirators, I searched for the newly identified codefendants using media documents to 
determine whether they were affiliated with the SCM.  If they were affiliated, I collected their 
court cases and documents as well.  Before I included the identified defendants in my SCM 
sample, I determined whether the court documents identified the indictees as: 1) adherents of the 
SCM; 2) linked to the SCM movement; or 3) the defendants self-identified as sovereign citizens 
during the trial.  Only defendants who met these criteria were included, allowing for greater 
certainty in my analyses.  I located 143 SCM cases using the preceding methods (containing 286 
defendants), and then I collected court case documents via PACER.  I was able to collect 
electronic documents on 127 cases (226 defendants), and I completed coding 97 of these cases 
and included them in my sample (150 defendants).   
 I added these cases to the ATS database, and pulled a comparison sample for analysis.  
The comparison group in this study is all of the far-right terrorist indictees in the ATS who were 
not categorized as modern era (2000-2015) sovereign citizens (N = 382).  The ATS categorizes 
the far-right as any group or individual that adheres to a radical right-wing ideology.  For 
example, this could include anti-Semitism, anti-black, white supremacist, or anti-abortion 
beliefs.  The final sample size for my project is 532 defendants. 
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Variables 
The majority of the variables I analyzed came from the existing pool of variables in the ATS 
database.  To examine the hypotheses associated with my first research question, I analyzed 
gender, race, education, marital status, age at arrest, and previous military experience.  
Education is an ordinal variable that captures the highest education level obtained by the 
defendant at the time he or she was indicted.  I recoded the variable into six categories (1=8th 
grade or less, 2=high school or less, 3=some college, 4=college graduate, 5=post-graduate work, 
6=doctorate degree).  Marital status is a categorical variable that captures the defendant’s marital 
status at the time of indictment (1=single, 2=married, 3=other), and military experience is a 
dichotomous variable (Yes=1, No=0) that measures whether the defendant had any prior military 
experience when he or she was indicted.  
To examine the hypotheses associated with my second research question, I used variables 
related to trial characteristics and prosecutorial strategies.  These variables include case result, 
conviction, case length, prosecution method, defense method, attorney type, and number of 
motions filed.  Case result is a categorical variable that captures several potential case outcomes.  
I recoded the original data into six categories (1=plea, 2=jury conviction, 3=dismissed, 
4=acquittal, 5=died prior to trial, 6=pending, all other outcomes were coded system missing).  
Conviction is a dichotomous variable that records whether the case resulted in a conviction 
(Yes=1, No=0).  Case length is a ratio variable that measures the number of months the court 
case lasted (from the date of indictment to the date of final judgment).   
Prosecution method is a categorical variable that captures the strategies used by 
prosecutors during the court case.  Prosecution method is operationalized into three categories: 
1) conventional criminality; 2) political innuendo/subtle innuendo; and 3) explicit politicality.  
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Conventional criminality occurs whenever the prosecution treats the defendant like a traditional 
offender; there is no mention of any terrorist groups or ideologies throughout the duration of the 
case.  Political innuendo/subtle innuendo occurs when the indictment falls silent with regard to 
the defendant’s connection to terrorism or a radical ideology, but the prosecutor later hints, 
suggests, or implies the connection during other phases of the case or trial.  Explicit politicality 
occurs when the state makes an explicit link between the defendant and a terrorist group and/or 
radical ideology in the indictment.  This strategy is characterized by heightened media coverage 
as well, and the “explicit” language can appear either through words used by the government 
stating that the defendant was involved in terrorist related activities, or it can be the result of the 
defendant being charged with terrorism specific charges from the United States Code.   
Defense method is a categorical variable that captures the strategies used by the defendant 
and/or their legal counsel during the court case.  Defense method is operationalized into nine 
categories: 1) lack of jurisdiction; 2) good faith; 3) good faith and lack of jurisdiction; 4) 
disassociation; 5) conventional; 6) affirmative/self-defense; 7) entrapment; 8) quasi-legal; and 9) 
other.  To code this variable, I looked at the motions filed by the defense and examined the 
language used in defense filings from the time of indictment until the time of judgment.  Motions 
filed after the judgment had been handed down were not considered.  Based on the types of 
motions, and the language used in them, I coded the variable into the aforementioned categories.  
If two or more defense types were used, I coded the method that was used the most.  As my 
coding progressed, I had to create new values.  The prior defense strategies coded in the ATS did 
not contain some of the strategies I found in SCM cases.  I included new values for good faith, 
lack of jurisdiction and good faith, and quasi-legal.  I selected good faith defense whenever the 
defendant claimed that tax evasion or tax fraud was the result of the defendant’s 
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misinterpretation of the Internal Revenue Laws.  When using this strategy, the defense would 
cite the Supreme Court ruling of Cheek v. United States (1991), which established that a person 
can have an actual good faith belief that they were not violating the law if they honestly 
misinterpreted the law and acted in a way that they believed was correct based on their good 
faith interpretation; in essence, good faith negates the defendant’s criminal purpose.  In each 
SCM case I examined, juries found that sovereign citizens had the purpose to defraud the U.S. 
government.  So despite being used on numerous occasions, this defense was never 
successful.  The quasi-legal strategy was created in an effort to capture sovereign citizens who 
claim that they were not breaking any laws with their actions.  The quasi-legal defense consists 
of the defendant flooding the court with numerous documents containing citations from real case 
law, but interpreted in a bogus and incorrect manner; hence the name quasi-legal.  The remaining 
method, good faith and lack of jurisdiction, is simply a combination of a lack of jurisdiction 
defense, which already existed in the ATS, and the good faith defense.  I selected the 
combination whenever the defense used both methods equally.   
Attorney type is a categorical variable that measures whether the defendant used a private 
attorney, appointed counsel/public defender, or if the defendant acted pro se.  If multiple 
attorney types were used throughout the court case, I coded the attorney type that the defendant 
was using at the time the jury reached a verdict, the defendant pleaded guilty, or the case was 
dismissed.  Number of motions filed is a continuous variable, measuring the number of motions 
filed by the defendant in the case.  This variable simply measures the number of motions, it 
makes no distinctions in the types of motions. 
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I divided the sample into a dichotomous variable based on two groups (SCM=1, Far-
Right=0).  I then performed independent samples T-Tests where my independent variables were 
ratio or interval.  I performed crosstabs when my independent variables were categorical.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS 
 
The results of this study are separated into two sections.  First I will present the descriptive 
statistics for demographic variables and trial strategies of the Sovereign Citizen Movement.  In 
the second section I present bivariate analyses of the SCM and far-right samples for each 
hypothesis I tested.  After coding the SCM cases I identified, and after pulling the existing far-
right cases from the ATS, I ended up with a total sample of 532 indictees.  That sample consisted 
of 150 sovereign citizen indictees and 382 other far-right indictees.  
 
       Table 1 Number of indictees for analysis 
Category Number of Indictees 
SCM 150 
Far-right 
 
Total 
382 
 
532 
 
 
In terms of general demographics of the SCM, the majority of indictees were male and white 
with just over 85% and 67% respectively (see Table 2).  Additionally, nearly 69% of sovereign 
citizens were married, and almost 18% of sovereign citizens had some sort of prior military 
experience.  In terms of education, sovereign citizens were extremely well educated with nearly 
49% being college graduates—almost 12% of indictees in my sample had received a doctorate 
degree of some kind.  Only 24.5% of sovereign citizens had a high school education or less.  In 
court cases involving indictees associated with the SCM, over 56% of the cases proceeded to 
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trial.  Broken down further, the cases resulted in a trial conviction 52% of the time and guilty 
pleas nearly 39% of the time, for an overall conviction rate of 91% (See Table 3).  When looking 
at prosecution method, the government was almost equally as likely to use a conventional 
criminality method as they were a political/subtle innuendo method—48.6 % and 50%, 
respectively—and less than 2% of indictees experienced explicit politicality.  Additionally, 
nearly half (43.8%) of sovereign citizens used a conventional defense and over a quarter (26.4%) 
of SCM indictees claimed that the federal government lacked jurisdiction to prosecute.  Looking 
at attorney type, over 54% of sovereign citizens used a public defender during their case, while a 
quarter decided on self-representation and appeared pro se.   
 
Table 2 Descriptives of SCM Categorical Variables 
Variable Value N Percent 
 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
 
128 
22 
 
85.3 
14.7 
 
 
Race 
 
White 
Non-white 
 
 
91 
44 
 
67.4 
32.6 
 
Marital Status 
 
 
Single 
Married 
Other 
 
 
18 
83 
20 
 
14.9 
68.6 
16.5 
 
Education 
 
 
Less than 8th grade 
High school or less 
Some college 
College graduate 
Post-graduate work 
Doctorate 
 
 
1 
22 
25 
30 
5 
11 
 
1.1 
23.4 
26.6 
31.9 
5.3 
11.7 
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Table 2 Descriptives of SCM Categorical Variables Cont. 
Variable Value N Percent 
 
Prior Military Experience 
 
Yes 
 
24 
 
17.5 
 
 
Trial Outcome 
 
 
Plea 
Trial conviction 
Dismissed 
Acquittal 
Died prior to trial 
 
 
58 
78 
7 
6 
1 
 
38.7 
52 
4.7 
4 
0.7 
 
Prosecution Method 
 
 
Conventional criminality 
Political/subtle innuendo 
Explicit politicality 
 
 
69 
71 
2 
 
48.6 
50 
1.4 
 
Defense Method 
 
 
Lack of jurisdiction 
Good faith 
Good faith and jurisdiction 
Disassociation 
Conventional 
Affirmative/Self-defense 
Entrapment 
Quasi-legal 
 
 
38 
16 
9 
12 
63 
1 
1 
4 
 
26.4 
11.1 
6.3 
8.3 
43.8 
0.7 
0.7 
2.8 
 
Attorney Type 
 
Pro se 
Public defender or CJA 
Private attorney 
 
 
37 
81 
31 
 
24.8 
54.4 
20.8 
 
 
The sovereign citizens in my sample averaged 52 years of age at the time of arrest (see 
Table 3), and their average case length was a little over 17 months.  Sovereign citizens also filed 
an average of 8.71 motions throughout the duration of their court case.  Additionally, I have 
included the frequencies for the remainder of the far-right using the same variables in Appendix 
1. 
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     Table 3 Descriptives of SCM Variables 
Variable N Mean 
 
Age at Arrest 
 
 
115 
 
52.3 
Case Length in Months 149 17.09 
 
Avg. Number of Motions Filed 
 
150 
 
8.71 
 
Conviction Rate 
 
150 
 
.91 
 
 
After running basic descriptive analyses on demographic, trial strategy, and trial behavior 
variables, I noted a clear, visible difference between the SCM and far-right on each individual 
variable.  To determine whether these differences were statistically significant, I performed a 
combination of crosstabs and independent samples T-tests.  Before I could do that, however, I 
noted from my frequencies that some variables contained less than five values per category.  I 
recoded those variables in order to run accurate crosstabs.  Race became a dichotomous variable 
(1=white, 0=non-white), and I recoded marital status as a dichotomous variable categorized by 
living arrangements (1=cohabitation, 0=non-cohabitation).  Cohabitation included defendants 
who were married or living with their significant other, and non-cohabitation included 
defendants who were single, divorced, separated, or widowed.  I recoded education into three 
groups (1=high school or less, 2=some college, 3=college graduate or more).  Additionally, trial 
outcome, prosecution method, and defense method had to be recoded as well.  I operationalized 
trial outcome into three categories (1=plea, 2=jury conviction, 3=no conviction), where “no 
conviction” included acquittals and dismissals.  Similarly I recoded prosecution method into a 
dichotomous variable (1=politicized, 0=conventional) by combining explicit politicality and 
subtle/political innuendo into “politicized” prosecution strategy.  Finally, I recoded defense 
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method into a dichotomous variable (1=lack of jurisdiction, 0=conventional), where “lack of 
jurisdiction” includes lack of jurisdiction, good faith, and good faith and lack of jurisdiction 
defenses.  Those results follow. 
 
Significance Tests – Demographic Variables 
 As mentioned above, I ran cross tabulations and independent samples T-tests depending 
on the independent variables.  T-tests were used to compare age at arrest, case length, number of 
motions filed, and conviction rate.  Crosstabs were used to compare the categorical variables, 
which include: gender, race, marital status, education level, military experience, case outcome, 
prosecution method, defense method, and attorney type.  
 
         Table 4 Crosstab of gender 
Gender Far-right SCM Total 
 
Male 
 
354 
92.7% 
 
128 
85.3% 
 
482 
90.6% 
 
Women 
 
28 
7.3% 
 
22 
14.7% 
 
50 
9.4% 
 
Total N=382 
100 
N=150 
100 
N=532 
100 
         (2 = 6.809    df = 1    p < .01) 
 
 
 There was a substantial difference between the SCM and far-right in terms of gender.  
While the majority of both the far-right (92.7%) and SCM (85.3%) were males, Table 4 reveals 
that the SCM sample had more than twice the proportion of female indictees (14.7%) than the 
remaining far-right (7.3%).  The model was statistically significant (p < .01) and supported the 
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first hypothesis, which asserted that SCM cases have a higher proportion of female defendants 
than other far-right cases. 
 
         Table 5 Crosstab of race 
Race Far-right SCM Total 
 
White 
 
349 
93.3% 
 
91 
67.4% 
 
440 
86.4% 
 
Non-white 
 
25 
6.7% 
 
44 
32.6% 
 
69 
13.6% 
 
Total N=374 
100 
N=135 
100 
N=509 
100 
         (2 = 56.819    df = 1    p = .000) 
 
 
 Table 5 provides the results of my analysis of the racial composition of the two samples, 
and it provides support for my second hypothesis, which asserted that SCM cases have a higher 
proportion of minority defendants than other far-right cases.  The majority of both the far-right 
and SCM samples were white, at around 93% and 67%, respectively, but there were large and 
statistically significant differences in the racial composition of both samples (Appendix 2).  
Notably, the proportion of black SCM defendants (24.4%) was nearly four times higher than the 
far-right sample (6.4%).  The SCM sample also contained 3% Asian defendants and 1% Native 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander defendants, where the far-right had none.  The model was statistically 
significant (p = .000). 
The following models on marital status, educational attainment, and military background 
are not tied to proposed hypotheses, but do examine the first research question.  The results for 
marital status are presented in Table 6.  A higher proportion of SCM indictees were married or 
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living with their significant other (70.2%) than in the far-right sample (56%), and the SCM 
sample contained fewer non-cohabitating defendants—29.8% compared to 44%.  Of the non-
cohabitating samples, 14.9% of SCM defendants and 27.6% of far-right defendants were single 
(Appendix 3).  The marital status model was statistically significant (p < .01). 
   
         Table 6 Crosstab of marital status 
Marital Status Far-right SCM Total 
 
Cohabitation 
 
150 
56% 
 
85 
70.2% 
 
235 
60.4% 
 
Non-cohabitation 
 
118 
44% 
 
36 
29.8% 
 
154 
39.6% 
 
Total N=268 
100 
N=121 
100 
N=389 
100 
         (2 = 7.106    df = 1    p < .01) 
 
 
         Table 7 Crosstab of education 
Education Far-right SCM Total 
 
High school or less 
 
130 
54.4% 
 
23 
24.5% 
 
153 
45.9% 
 
Some college 
 
69 
28.9% 
 
25 
26.6% 
 
94 
28.2% 
 
College graduate or 
more 
40 
16.7% 
46 
48.9% 
 
86 
25.8% 
Total N=239 
100 
N=94 
100 
N=333 
100 
         (2 = 40.358    df = 2    p = .000) 
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 The results of the education model are presented Table 7.  Adherents of the SCM were 
substantially more educated than the defendants in the far-right sample, and the model was 
statistically significant (p = .000).  Nearly half of the sovereign citizen defendants (48.9%) had at 
least an undergraduate degree as compared to only 16.7% of far-right defendants.  By contrast, 
the majority of far-right defendants (54.4%) had at most only received a high school diploma, 
while only 24.5% of sovereign citizens fell into this category.  I ran frequencies on both groups 
and the results showed an even more substantial difference (Appendix 4).  While almost 49% of 
sovereign citizens had at least a college degree, nearly 12% of the sample had received a 
doctorate degree of some kind—these degrees were held by people that were doctors, dentists, 
and lawyers.  None of the far-right indictees had gone on to receive a doctorate degree of any 
kind.   
 
         Table 8 Crosstab of military experience 
Military Experience Far-right SCM Total 
 
Yes 
 
72 
38.3% 
 
24 
17.5% 
 
96 
29.5% 
 
No 
 
116 
61.7% 
 
113 
82.5% 
 
229 
70.5% 
 
Total N=188 
100 
N=137 
100 
N=325 
100 
         (2 = 16.441    df = 1    p = .000) 
 
 
In Table 8 we found a statistically significant difference (p = .000) in prior military 
experience between the two samples.  Within the SCM sample, only 17.5% of the indictees had 
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any prior experience, while more than twice the proportion of right wing indictees (38.3%) had 
prior military experience.   
Additionally, Appendix 5 shows that the difference in age at arrest between the SCM and 
far-right was statistically significant (p = .000).  The average age at arrest for sovereign citizens 
was 52.30 years old and the average age for the far-right was 38.71.  Appendix 6 shows a more 
detailed breakdown of the sample by age groups in order to show the age ranges of the two 
groups. 
Each of the analyses above provided statistically significant differences between the 
SCM adherents and the far-right defendants contained in the ATS.  Each of my first three 
hypotheses was supported, suggesting that the answer to my first research question is, yes, the 
SCM is demographically dissimilar to the far-right.  But that only completes part of my analyses.  
In the next section I report the findings on my second research question: whether SCM adherents 
are treated differently than other far-right defendants in the court, and whether SCM adherents 
behave differently in court than do other far-right defendants. 
 
Significance Tests – Courtroom Behavior Variables 
 In Table 9 we see the first examination of variables related to the second research 
question.  The majority of SCM indictees (52%) were convicted by a jury, while just under 39% 
pleaded guilty prior to trial.  The far-right shows a very different trend.  Nearly 52% of right 
wing indictees pleaded guilty prior to trial, and just over 31% were convicted by a jury.  
Additionally, over 17% of far-right defendants and over 9% of SCM defendants received no 
conviction at all.  Another interesting result was the higher acquittal and dismissal rates enjoyed 
by the far-right (7.7% for each) (Appendix 7).  By contrast, SCM defendants secured acquittals 
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just 4% of the time, and dismissals just 4.7% of the time.  The case result model was statistically 
significant (p = .000).  The results generally supported H4, which asserted that sovereign citizens 
take their cases to trial more than other far-right defendants, and H5, which asserted that SCM 
defendants enter into fewer plea bargains than other far-right defendants.  
 
         Table 9 Crosstab of trial outcome 
Trial Outcome Far-right SCM Total 
 
Plea 
 
193 
51.5% 
 
58 
38.7% 
 
251 
47.8% 
 
Jury conviction 
 
117 
31.2% 
 
78 
52% 
 
195 
37.1% 
 
No conviction 65 
17.3% 
14 
9.3% 
 
79 
15% 
Total N=375 
100 
N=150 
100 
N=525 
100 
         (2 = 20.709    df = 2    p = .000) 
 
 
         Table 10 Crosstab of prosecution method 
Prosecution Method Far-right SCM Total 
 
Conventional 
 
57 
16.9% 
 
69 
48.6% 
 
126 
26.3% 
 
Politicized 
 
281 
83.1% 
 
73 
51.4% 
 
354 
73.8% 
 
Total N=338 
100 
N=142 
100 
N=480 
100 
         (2 = 51.993    df = 1    p = .000) 
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 I did not posit a hypothesis on prosecution strategies, but examined this variable because 
it is tied to the second research question, and could potentially influence defendant behavior.  
Table 10 reveals (p = .000) that federal prosecutors used different strategies to prosecute SCM 
defendants than they used with far-right defendants.  The majority of both far-right and SCM 
defendants experienced politicized prosecution—83.1% and 51.4%, respectively.  However, only 
16.9% of the far-right experienced a conventional method, while almost 49% of sovereign 
citizens experienced that same method.  Appendix 8 shows a more interesting breakdown of 
prosecution methods between the two groups that could not be shown with the recoding of this 
variable.  Prosecutors were more likely to use a political/subtle innuendo prosecution strategy on 
sovereign citizens (50%) than on far-rightists (29%).  In fact, the results revealed that prosecutors 
treat far-right defendants more aggressively, exposing them to explicit politicality prosecution 
strategies more than half the time (54.1%), whereas sovereign citizen indictees were subjected to 
explicit politicality less than 2% of the time.  
Sovereign citizens behaved differently at trial as well (see Table 11).  Sovereign citizens 
used unique defenses at trial and defense methods were used to test H7.  Defendants in the SCM 
sample used lack of jurisdiction, good faith, and a combination of good faith/lack of jurisdiction 
at a rate of 32.6%, while far-right defendants used this method only 12.4% of the time.  This is 
important, as the good faith defense and the good faith/lack of jurisdiction defenses were created 
specifically for SCM court cases, as they do not occur in far-right cases.  But there were 
similarities between the two groups as well.  Nearly 68% of sovereign citizens and nearly 88% of 
far-rightists used a conventional defense in their trials.  This model was statistically significant (p 
= .000) and generally supported H7, which stated that sovereign citizens use lack of jurisdiction 
defense at a higher rate than other far-right defendants.  
 42 
         Table 11 Crosstab of defense method 
Defense Method Far-right SCM Total 
 
Conventional 
 
282 
87.6% 
 
97 
67.4% 
 
379 
81.3% 
 
Lack of jurisdiction 
 
40 
12.4% 
 
47 
32.6% 
 
87 
18.7% 
 
Total N=322 
100 
N=144 
100 
N=466 
100 
         (2 = 26.783    df = 1    p = .000) 
 
 
When comparing differences in attorney type, the majority of sovereign citizens and far-
rightists were represented by a public defender or CJA at a rate of 54.7% and 74.1%, 
respectively (see Table 12).  Importantly, Sovereign citizens were more likely to appear pro se 
(almost 25% of the time) than right-wing indictees (14%).  Additionally, the rate of private  
 
        Table 12 Crosstab of attorney type 
Attorney Type Far-right SCM Total 
 
Pro se 
 
47 
14% 
 
37 
24.7% 
 
84 
17.3% 
 
Public defender or 
CJA 
 
249 
74.1% 
 
82 
54.7% 
 
331 
68.1% 
 
Private attorney 40 
11.9% 
31 
20.7% 
 
71 
14.6% 
Total N=336 
100 
N=150 
100 
N=486 
100 
         (2 = 18.046    df = 2    p = .000) 
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attorney representation with the SCM is almost double that of the far-right—20.7% compared to 
11.9%.  Differences in attorney type proved to be statistically significant (p = .000) and provided 
support for H8 that sovereign citizen indictees are more likely to use self-representation than 
other far-right defendants. 
 Table 13 provides the results for my analyses of case lengths, number of motions filed, 
and conviction rates.  The mean case length involving sovereign citizens (17.05 months) was 
over five months longer than cases involving far-right indictees (11.68 months), providing 
support for H9, which asserted that SCM court cases would be longer than far-right cases.  The 
Levene’s test indicated that the variances were equal (Sig. .062), and the results were statistically 
significant (p = .000).  The mean number of motions filed by the sovereign citizen indictees 
(8.71) was less than half the number of motions filed by far-rightists (20.72).  The Levene’s test 
showed that variances were not equal (Sig. .000), but the results were statistically significant (p = 
.000).  These results did not support H10.  Finally, analysis revealed that the conviction rate of  
 
  Table 13 Differences between SCM and Far-right Independent Samples T-Tests 
Factor Group N Mean Std. Dev. Sig. 
      
 
Average case length 
 
SCM 
Far-right 
 
 
150 
369 
 
17.05 
11.68 
 
12.98 
12.70 
 
.000* 
 
Num. of motions 
filed 
 
SCM 
Far-right 
 
 
150 
332 
 
8.71 
20.72 
 
10.29 
36.43 
 
.000** 
 
Conviction rate 
 
SCM 
Far-right 
 
 
 
150 
375 
 
.91 
.83 
 
.29 
.38 
 
.01** 
* equal variance assumed 
** equal variance not assumed 
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sovereign citizens (91%) was higher than for indictees associated with the far-right (83%).  The 
Levene’s test revealed that equal variances were not assumed (Sig. .000).  The difference in 
conviction rates was statistically significant (p = .01) and the results supported H6, which posited 
that sovereign citizens have a higher conviction rate than other far-right defendants. 
 Whether comparing the SCM to the far-right with demographic factors, trial behaviors, or 
trial strategies, there are substantial differences.  The bivariate analyses revealed that every 
measure was statistically significant, which strongly supports the proposition that the two groups 
should be analyzed separately, as not doing so would cloud important distinctions.  In the 
following chapter I will discuss the implications further.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This study examines the differences that are present between the Sovereign Citizen Movement 
and the far-right in basic demographic composition and trial strategies and behaviors.  The 
analysis revealed that there are significant differences, and at times, substantial differences, in 
every variable analyzed.  This has implications for the ways in which most research is currently 
being conducted.  In this chapter, I will present an argument that supports analyzing the SCM 
separately from the far-right in future research.  I will also discuss a few of the limitations of this 
study.  
For the first research question, I tested a number of hypotheses to determine whether the 
SCM was similar demographically to the rest of the far-right.  The majority of both the SCM and 
the far-right samples are males, however, the SCM has a significant number of females (14.7%), 
which is more than twice the proportion of females in the far-right (7.3%).  One explanation is 
that perhaps the non-violent focus of paper terrorism is more appealing to women.  Another 
likely cause is the SCM’s shift away from Christian Identity ideology, which traditionally placed 
women in subordinate roles to men.  The anti-tax and anti-government ideology of the SCM does 
not appear to embrace gender distinctions, but more research needs to be focused in this area.   
There were significant and substantial differences in the racial composition between the 
SCM and the far-right.  Nearly one-quarter of the SCM sample was black; black indictees were 
part of a non-white sample that totaled almost 33%.  In contrast, the far-right sample contained a 
relatively small (6.7%) proportion of non-white indictees, and many of the minorities indicted 
were not group members, but merely got caught up as co-defendants in complex conspiracies.  
The increase in the minority population within the SCM is most likely a result of the movement 
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moving away from the racist roots of Christian Identity (ADL, 2012).  The literature suggests 
that the SCM has shifted to an ideology that is based solely on anti-tax and anti-government 
beliefs, and as a result blacks are increasingly becoming a part of the SCM and the related 
Moorish Movement.  I found support for Nelson’s (2011) and Parker’s (2014) contentions that 
blacks are choosing to overlook the racist roots of the SCM and adhere to the current racially-
benign anti-government ideology. 
One of the more glaring differences I noted was in educational attainment.  Overall, 
sovereign citizens were much more educated than the other far-right defendants.  Over half of the 
sovereign citizens in the sample had attained a college degree, while most far-right indictees 
received, at most, a high school education.  There are a few possible explanations for this.  First, 
the schemes used by the SCM involving tax evasion and fraudulent liens might require a higher 
educational background to understand and initiate.  It might also be possible that more highly 
educated people are attracted to the non-violent SCM ideology and tactics than they are to the 
violent far-right.  The loose nature of the SCM might also be more attractive to individuals with 
higher educational attainment.  As was mentioned in the literature review, SCM adherents are 
largely “in it alone.”  They ignore the parts of the ideology they do not like, while embracing the 
parts they do.  That is probably much different than members of the far-right, and especially far-
right groups, which are more likely to require allegiance to the entire ideology.  In either case, 
this should be addressed in future research.   
The average age of sovereign citizens was around 13 years older than indictees in the far-
right.  Remarkably, the standard deviation for the far-right sample on the variable of age was 
slightly higher than the SCM sample, and that combined with the t-test results (in Appendix 5) 
indicate that the difference between the groups is real, and not the product of outliers.  So not 
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only does the SCM appeal to a wider ranger of people racially, to more women, and to people of 
higher educational attainment, it also appeals to an older demographic.    
Another difference is somewhat puzzling, but also quite telling.  The far-right sample 
contained more than twice the proportion of people with military backgrounds than did the 
sovereign citizens sample.  I cannot find much in the literature to explain this difference.  The 
difference could be a reflection of educational attainment, and it could be a result of greater 
gender diversity.  It is also possible that the non-violent tactics and ideology of the SCM are 
more attractive to a broader range of people (military and non-military alike), whereas the 
violent tactics of the far-right holds particular appeal to a smaller group of individuals, including 
those with a military background (Simi & Bubolz, 2013).  
In terms of marital status, the majority of both the SCM and far-right defendants were 
married.  However, sovereign citizens were married at a rate of nearly 15% higher than far-
rightists.  One explanation for this might again turn towards the non-violent tactics of the SCM.  
Individuals might be more inclined to adopt non-violent SCM extremist ideologies when they are 
part of a stable family unit, while single and divorced individuals, without the stability of 
marriage, might be less inhibited by the violence of the far-right.  Another explanation of this 
could be correlated to education level.  The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 1979) asserts that men who had received a 
bachelor’s degree were more likely to be married than men who had not graduated from college.  
Moreover, the study suggests that divorce rates were inversely related to education level and that 
more than 50% of respondents who had not received a high school diploma had marriages that 
ended in divorce.  Sovereign citizens are significantly more likely to have received a college 
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degree, which could explain why their marriage rates are higher and divorce rates are lower, 
where the inverse might explain the far-right. 
 The results are similar for research question two: the SCM and far-right are significantly 
different from each other when looking at trial strategies and defendant behaviors.  The analysis I 
performed on the differences in trial outcomes revealed that over half of sovereign citizens are 
convicted by jury at trial, and just over 31% of far-right cases result in jury conviction.  In all, 
56% of SCM cases go to trial.  That is an astounding number, but it is entirely inconsistent with 
the literature, which suggests that SCM defendants tend to use the courts as a means to fight 
what they see as an illegitimate government.  The literature also suggests that the far-right (and 
terrorists in general) have a habit of using the courts as a platform to spread their agenda (Shields 
et al., 2006), and that cases involving terrorism defendants typically involve lower plea bargain 
rates (Smith, 1994; Damphousse & Shields, 2007; Shields et al., 2009; Shields, 2012).  
Nonetheless, the difference between the SCM and the far-right is startling.  Almost 52% of far-
right cases result in a guilty plea prior to trial, which is much lower than the national average 
(96%), but SCM cases result in guilty pleas less than 40% of the time.  Shields (2012) found a 
correlation between negative case dispositions (higher trial rates and fewer convictions) in 
terrorism cases and the prosecution’s use of an explicit politicality prosecution method (a highly 
politicized trial strategy used in high profile cases).  That, however, was not the case here.  SCM 
cases in this sample were prosecuted using a non-politicized strategy (common criminality) as 
frequently as they were prosecuted using a slightly politicized strategy.  While prosecutors did 
use some moderately politicized prosecution strategies against the SCM, Shields’ (2012) study 
did not find a significant relationship between the “middle” approach and a defendant’s decision 
to take his or her case to trial.  As I did not run a multivariate analysis in this study, I cannot say 
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whether the middle strategy has a different impact on SCM defendants.  It might.  But there is 
another possibility; the results tend to support trends reported in the literature, that SCM 
defendants intend to bog down the court (IACP, 2014).   
 The literature suggests that there is an inherent risk when the government uses an explicit 
politicality prosecution method.  Not only does it increase media coverage, it substantially 
reduces the likelihood that defendants will force their cases to trial, and when at trial, their odds 
of gaining an acquittal or a dismissal go up (Shields, 2008; Shields et al., 2009).  Once again, we 
find different results.  As mentioned above, even though the government pursues the far-right 
with explicit politicality much more often than the SCM, the SCM is far more likely to not only 
go to trial, but almost counter intuitively, to get convicted.  This is probably a function of the 
defense strategies used.  And once again, the defense methods used by the SCM and far-right are 
dramatically different.  While the majority of both sovereign citizens and far-rightists used a 
conventional defense, over 32% of sovereign citizens and over 12% of the remaining far-right 
used either good faith, lack of jurisdiction, or a combination of the two defenses.  Another factor 
that is probably contributing to their high conviction rates is tied to their ideology and rooted in 
their distrust of attorneys.  Among SCM defendants, 24.7% appeared pro se.  Pro se defenses are 
notoriously ineffective.  Again, this probably accounts for some of the increased conviction rate.  
The available literature suggests that sovereign citizens take pleasure in filing numerous 
documents during trial proceedings in an effort to harass the court system into dropping their 
case; they believe the best way to do this is to file numerous motions.  While I found no support 
for my hypothesis predicting that sovereign citizens would try to bog down the court with 
motions, the explanation for this may be linked to the defendants appearing pro se in such great 
numbers.  Licensed attorneys are intimately more familiar with defense proceedings and file 
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motions to cover any manner of issues as a case progresses.  Pro se defendants are most likely 
unfamiliar with many of these.  Ergo, pro se defendants just file fewer motions.  Another 
possibility is also very likely.  SCM defendants use paper terrorism against actors in the 
courtroom, prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officers.  Paper terrorism, such as a 
fraudulent tax lien, is not accomplished by filing a motion in a criminal hearing, so any real 
retaliation the defendants are engaging in will not show up in the court records.  It is worth 
noting, however, that SCM cases are generally longer in length than far-right cases.  Future 
studies will have to determine why this is the case.  
 Although all of the differences in the findings were statistically significant, there were 
certain limitations to the study.  Due to time constraints I was not able to code all of the cases 
that I had collected.  The remaining cases will be coded at some point in the future, and these 
analyses will be easy to reproduce.  Also, the sample in this study only included non-violent acts, 
and that is because I did not come across any violent sovereign citizen court cases at the federal 
level.  According to the literature sovereign citizens typically engage in violent acts when 
confronted by law enforcement officers during traffic stops or residence visits.  This means that 
violent cases are most likely to appear in state court.  The addition of state SCM cases would be 
beneficial to future analyses.  Finally, the average number of motions for the SCM could be low 
due to how I coded this variable.  I only counted documents labeled as “motions” when I should 
have also included “demands” in the total number of motions filed.  That will need to be 
addressed in the future.  Additionally, it would be beneficial to count all of the quasi-legal 
paperwork filed by sovereign citizens.  Most sovereign citizens filed numerous pro se 
documents, but they were not filed as motions.  Rather they were filed as “notices” and 
“affidavits” and for this reason were not counted as motions filed.  However, these filings are 
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still being used to bog down the court system, and should be looked at more closely in future 
research.  These limitations will be addressed in more detail, as well as suggestions for future 
research, in the following section.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The current study has clearly shown that there are significant differences between the Sovereign 
Citizen Movement and the far-right, however, this study is only creating a foundation for future 
research.  There are still large steps to be taken to understand more completely how the SCM 
operates and what role it plays within the broader far-right movement.  This section will list a 
few areas of study that I believe will be beneficial to analyze in the future. 
 One area of future research that needs to be investigated involves the collection and 
analysis of state SCM court cases.  This will permit the capture of missing data on violent 
sovereign citizen incidents.  Including violent perpetrators into the analysis will allow for a more 
robust sample to compare to the far-right in order to determine whether there are still significant 
differences between the two groups.  Furthermore, if the differences between the far-right and 
SCM diminish with the addition of violent sovereign citizens, then more research must be 
conducted to determine how sovereign citizens who engage in violence are different from those 
who choose paper terrorism as their primary tactic.  Even though no state court cases were 
included in the current study due to ATS methodology and inclusion criteria, the results 
presented above provide an accurate picture of how the SCM relates to the broader far-right—
adding violent sovereign citizens to the data set will allow for more comprehensive analyses.  
 Future research should also focus on the tactics and targets of the SCM.  The available 
literature suggests the SCM uses a vast number of tactics and selects ideologically motivated 
targets; yet, again there have been no empirical studies to date.  It is important to determine 
whether sovereign citizens actually use paper terrorism tactics in the ways suggested in the 
literature, and to study the frequency with which they focus their attentions towards targets 
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affiliated with the government and law enforcement.  That information could prove crucial in 
efforts to combat adherents of the SCM.  During the course of this project I collected information 
on the tactics and targets associated with each of the SCM court cases I coded.  However, due to 
the ultimate direction the project took, I was unable to evaluate these data.  Nonetheless, I 
believe these data hold promise for future research.    
 The literature suggests that unlike typical criminals, sovereign citizens are more likely to 
continue operating at every level of incarceration.  As with tactics and targets, I also collected 
data on whether the defendants were indicted for actions they carried out while in prison.  I think 
future research on this area is vital to understanding how extensive the threat of incarcerated 
sovereign citizens may be.  The literature states that sovereign inmates utilize the prison libraries 
to research case law in an effort to continually develop new ways to create and file fraudulent 
legal and financial documents and engage in criminal activity (DTOU, 2010).  Understanding 
SCM operations behind bars and stopping them before they begin could help to substantially 
reduce the number of retaliatory liens and lawsuits targeting law enforcement and government 
officials that are being filed from prison. 
 As I read through hundreds of court documents I noted a pattern in sovereign citizen pro 
se court document filings; there is an obvious connection to religion within the movement.  The 
vast majority of pro se filings contained numerous Bible verses, which the authors used as a tool 
to support the radical arguments they were making.  Although the SCM is no longer under the 
umbrella of Christian Identity, the movement’s ideology is still rooted in the belief that the 
federal government is illegitimate because it is no longer governing by God’s law (ADL, 2012).  
In future studies it would be interesting to focus on how the SCM uses religious references, and 
for what purpose. 
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 Finally, I suggest that future research looks at the actions of sovereign citizens during the 
trial (i.e. targeting judges and prosecutors with lawsuits).  I came across a handful of examples 
where sovereign citizens used aggressive paper terrorism tactics during trial proceedings in an 
effort to harass government representatives to drop their cases.  This includes filing frivolous 
lawsuits, demanding payment to be made to the sovereign citizen because the court system used 
their real name, and filing liens against prosecutors in retaliation to them bringing charges 
against the sovereign.  Currently the ATS does not collect data on any variables that would 
capture these types of tactics used during trial; so new variables would have to be made.  This 
would be important to research in order to better educate the workers of the legal system on what 
to look for and how to protect themselves from being the victims of paper terrorism.  
 Continuing to conduct research on the Sovereign Citizen Movement is vital to the 
understanding of the movement and to continue building on the still lacking knowledge on the 
details of how the SCM operates. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
The literature that preceded this study was largely anecdotal and lacked empirical research.  
What was known about the Sovereign Citizen Movement was focused towards basic 
demographics, tactics, and targets of the movement, with no focus on SCM trial strategies and 
behaviors.  The current study adds to the available literature by providing an empirical 
examination of the demographic composition of the SCM, as well as an examination of how 
sovereign citizens and prosecutors behave during the course of criminal trials.  This study reveals 
statistically significant differences between the SCM and far-right—all but one of my hypotheses 
were supported—and illustrates the need to treat the two groups separately in future analyses.  
The SCM and far-right are demographically different from one another and they operate 
differently at trial.  
Future research must also explore the SCM and its relationship to the far-right even 
further.  This might include the addition of state-level violent SCM cases to the sample, and it 
should probably involve a thorough investigation of the tactics and targets associated with 
sovereign citizen adherents.  Importantly, research needs to be conducted on how sovereign 
citizens target government officials during their trials and how they continue to operate while 
incarcerated.  This study has created a foundation for future research on the SCM to be built 
upon.  This project reveals for the first time that there is in fact a significant difference between 
the SCM and far-right while also providing evidence of how the two groups are different.  What 
is not known, however, is why they are different and that is the next question that needs to be 
answered.   
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CHAPTER TEN 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 Descriptives of Far-right Categorical Variables 
Variable Value N Percent 
 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
 
354 
28 
 
92.7 
7.3 
 
 
Race 
 
White 
Non-white 
 
 
349 
25 
 
93.3 
6.7 
 
Marital Status 
 
 
Single 
Married 
Other 
 
 
74 
145 
49 
 
27.6 
54.1 
18.3 
 
Education 
 
 
Less than 8th grade 
High school or less 
Some college 
College graduate 
Post-graduate work 
Doctorate 
 
 
7 
123 
69 
37 
3 
0 
 
2.9 
51.5 
28.9 
15.5 
1.3 
0 
 
Prior Military Experience 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
72 
 
38.3 
 
Trial Outcome 
 
 
Plea 
Trial conviction 
Dismissed 
Acquittal 
Died prior to trial 
Awaiting trial 
 
193 
117 
29 
29 
4 
3 
 
51.5 
31.2 
7.7 
7.7 
1.1 
0.8 
 
 
Prosecution Method 
 
 
Conventional criminality 
Political/subtle innuendo 
Explicit politicality 
 
 
57 
98 
183 
 
16.9 
29 
54.1 
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Appendix 1 Descriptives of Far-right Categorical Variables Cont. 
 
Defense Method 
 
 
Lack of jurisdiction 
Good faith 
Good faith and jurisdiction 
Disassociation 
Conventional 
Affirmative/Self-defense 
Quasi-legal 
 
 
40 
0 
0 
78 
157 
3 
0 
 
12.4 
0 
0 
24.2 
48.8 
0.9 
0 
 
Attorney Type 
 
Pro se 
Public defender or CJA 
Private attorney 
 
 
47 
249 
40 
 
14 
74.1 
11.9 
 
 
 
 
 
         Appendix 2 Frequencies of Race for the SCM and Far-right 
Race Far-right SCM Total 
 
White 
 
349 
93.3% 
 
91 
67.4% 
 
440 
86.4% 
 
Black 
 
24 
6.4% 
 
33 
24.4% 
 
57 
11.2% 
 
Asian 0 
0% 
4 
3% 
4 
0.8% 
 
Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
 
0 
0% 
 
1 
0.7% 
 
1 
0.2% 
 
Other 
 
1 
0.3% 
 
6 
4.4% 
 
 
7 
1.4% 
Total N=374 
100 
N=135 
100 
N=509 
100 
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         Appendix 3 Frequencies of Marital Status for the SCM and Far-right 
Marital Status Far-right SCM Total 
 
Single 
 
74 
27.6% 
 
18 
14.9% 
 
92 
23.7% 
 
Married 
 
145 
54.1% 
 
83 
68.6% 
 
228 
58.6% 
 
Other 49 
18.3% 
20 
16.5% 
 
69 
17.7% 
Total N=268 
100 
N=121 
100 
N=389 
100 
 
 
 
 
         Appendix 4 Frequencies of Education for the SCM and Far-right 
Education Far-right SCM Total 
 
8th grade or less 
 
7 
2.9% 
 
1 
1.1% 
 
8 
2.4% 
 
High school or less 
 
123 
51.5% 
 
22 
23.4% 
 
145 
43.5% 
 
Some college 69 
28.9% 
25 
26.6% 
94 
28.2% 
 
College graduate 
 
37 
15.5% 
 
30 
31.9% 
 
67 
20.1% 
 
Post-graduate work 
 
3 
1.3% 
 
5 
5.3% 
 
8 
2.4% 
 
Doctorate 
 
0 
0% 
 
 
11 
11.7% 
 
11 
3.3% 
Total N=239 
100 
N=94 
100 
N=333 
100 
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         Appendix 5 Age at Arrest Independent Samples T-Test 
Factor Group N Mean Std. Dev. Sig. 
 
Age at arrest 
 
SCM 
Far-right 
 
115 
340 
 
52.30 
38.71 
 
12.32 
12.67 
 
.000* 
         * equal variances assumed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Appendix 6 Frequencies of Age at Arrest by Age Group for the SCM and Far-right 
Age Group Far-right SCM Total 
 
1 to 20 
 
14 
4.1% 
 
2 
1.7% 
 
16 
3.5% 
 
21 to 40 
 
187 
55% 
 
16 
13.9% 
 
203 
44.6% 
 
41 to 60 122 
35.9% 
65 
56.5% 
187 
41.1% 
 
61 or older 
 
17 
5% 
 
32 
27.8% 
 
49 
10.8% 
 
Total N=340 
100 
N=115 
100 
N=455 
100 
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         Appendix 7 Frequencies of Trial Outcome for the SCM and Far-right 
Trial Outcome Far-right SCM Total 
 
Plea 
 
193 
51.5% 
 
58 
38.7% 
 
251 
47.8% 
 
Jury conviction 
 
117 
31.2% 
 
78 
52% 
 
195 
37.1% 
 
Dismissed 29 
7.7% 
7 
4.7% 
36 
6.9% 
 
Acquittal 
 
29 
7.7% 
 
6 
4% 
 
35 
6.7% 
 
Died prior to trial 
 
4 
1.1% 
 
1 
0.7% 
 
5 
1% 
 
Awaiting trial 
 
3 
0.8% 
 
 
0 
0% 
 
3 
0.6% 
Total N=375 
100 
N=150 
100 
N=525 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
      Appendix 8 Frequencies of Prosecution Method for the SCM and Far-right 
Prosecution Method Far-right SCM Total 
 
Conventional Criminality 
 
57 
16.9% 
 
69 
48.6% 
 
126 
26.3% 
 
Political/subtle innuendo 
 
98 
29% 
 
71 
50% 
 
169 
35.2% 
 
Explicit politicality 183 
54.1% 
2 
1.4% 
 
185 
38.5% 
Total N=338 
100 
N=142 
100 
N=480 
100 
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Appendix 9 Research Compliance Protocol Letter 
 
 
 
